LINE

This disposition, which is the best calculated for the operations of naval war, is formed by drawing up the ships in a long file, or right line, prolonged from the keel of the hindmost to that of the foremost, and palling longitudinally through the keels of all the others, from the van to the rear; so that they are, according to the sea-phrase, in the wake of each other.

In the line, or order of battle, all the Ships of which it is composed are close hauled, upon the starboard or larboard-tack, about 50 fathoms distant from each other. See plate V. fig. 6. where a b represents the elevation, and A B the plan of this order, upon the starboard-tack; the direction of the wind in both being expressed by the arrow in the latter.

Plate V

A fleet is more particularly drawn up in the line when in presence of an enemy. It ought to be formed in such a manner as that the ships should mutually sustain and reinforce each other, and yet preserve a sufficient space in their stations, to work or direct their movements with facility during the action. Thus they will be enabled effectually to cannonade the enemy, without incommoding the ships of their own squadron.

The line close-hauled is peculiarly chosen as the order of battle, because if the fleet, which is to windward, were arranged in any other line, the enemy might soon gain the weather-gage of it; and even if he thinks it expedient to decline that advantage, it will yet be in his power to determine the distance between the adverse fleets, in an engagement, and to compel the other to action. The fleet to leeward, being in a line close-hauled, parallel to the enemy, can more readily avail itself of a change of the wind, or of the neglect of its adversary, by which it may, by a dextrous management, get to windward of him or, should it sail in this attempt, it will nevertheless be enabled, by the favourable state of the wind, to avoid coming to action, if the enemy is greatly superior; or to prevent him from escaping, if he should attempt it.

Besides these advantages, this order of battle is singularly convenient and proper in other respects. The sails of each ship are disposed in such a manner as to counter-act each other, so that the ships in general neither advance nor retreat during the action. By this circumstance they are enabled to retain their stations with greater stability, and to prosecute the battle with vigour and resolution, yet without perplexity and disorder. The uniformity of the line will be preserved, so that the admiral's orders may be readily communicated by signals from the van to the rear. The distress of any particular ship, that is disabled and rendered incapable to continue the action, will be presently discovered, and her place accordingly supplied by one of the ships in reserve. The circumstances and situation of the enemy's line will be ever open to the view of the commander in chief, so that he may be enabled to convert any disaster that may happen therein to his own advantages

It may be alleged indeed, that the same reasons hold good with regard to the enemy, to whom this arrangement will be equally beneficial. It may also be observed, that particular occasions have rendered it necessary to break the order of the line; and that sometimes this expedient has been practised with equal judgment and success. To the first of these allegations it may be answered, that in war as well as politics, there are certain general rules absolutely necessary to be observed by the hostile powers: rules which are founded on mutual convenience, and authorised by the invariable example of all ages! Whatever tends to facilitate the designs of the adverse parties on each other, or whatever operates to shorten the period of war, and render it less destructive and fatal, are objects which ought never to be disregarded. Disorder has not only a tendency to protract the war, but to make it more bloody and ruinous, and to aggravate all the calamities with which it is inseparably attended. Perhaps this observation is particularly applicable to our present purpose. unless the consequences of disorder in a sea-fight, as related below, should rather be considered as the creation of fancy, than a recital of facts, naturally resulting from known causes. Although peculiar circumstances have sometimes, by their success, justified the measure of engaging an enemy's fleet, without forming the line; or after the line has been separated; there is nevertheless very few operations in war that require greater delicacy and vigilance, if the hostile fleets are very near to each other. Perhaps no military enterprize can be attended with greater hazard, or with fewer hopes of success. The incessant fire of so large an assembly of ships in a very short time covers the scene of action with a cloud of smoke, which is constantly accumulating. The winds that enabled the two fleets to approach each other are soon become extremely feeble, or perhaps perfectly lulled, by the explosions of a vigorous cannonade: they are of course incapable any longer to dissipate the smoke, which then darkens the air, and is almost impenetrable to the eye. If in this situation the hostile ships are promiscuously scattered amongst each other, it is easy to foretell the mischief, perplexity, and distraction, to which the whole will be inevitably exposed. Not only is the most comprehensive skill of the commander in chief rendered useless; the smaller ships, abandoned to their ill fortune, may be torn to pieces by superior force, without relief or succour: and, what is infinitely worse than all, the ships of the same fleet may cannonade each other, with all the resolution and spirit which they exert against their enemies ! If the design of war is conquest, and not massacre, it is thus totally perverted! The battle, instead of being brought to a speedy issue, and decided by a victory and defeat, is unhappily protracted into a scene of slaughter and ruin, equally fatal and undecisive to both parties.

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